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RAYNOR V. STATE: NON-INTRUSIVE DNA TESTING FOR 
THE SOLE PURPOSE OF IDENTIFICATION IS NOT A 
SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
 
By: Bradley T. Bald 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that DNA testing of thirteen junk 
loci unknowingly exposed to the public for purposes of identification, not 
obtained by physical intrusion, was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.  
Raynor v. State, 440 Md. 71, 96, 99 A.3d 753, 768 (2014).  
     On April 2, 2006, a perpetrator broke into the victim’s bedroom, raped her 
repeatedly, and then fled the scene.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 75, 99 A.3d at 755.  
The victim was unable to view the attacker’s face, but noticed that he exuded 
a “metallic scent.”  Id.  A crime scene technician processed the scene for 
evidence, including blood from her pillow and around the door; the victim also 
underwent a rape examination at the hospital.  Id. at 75-76, 99 A.3d at 755.  
Approximately two years later, the victim contacted an investigator with 
suspicion that Glenn Joseph Raynor (“Raynor”) was the perpetrator.  Id. at 76, 
99 A.3d at 755.   
     The police contacted Raynor who agreed to go to the station for an 
interview.  Id.  During the interview, officers noticed that Raynor exhibited a 
metallic odor similar to that described by the victim.  Id. at 76, 99 A.3d at 755-
56.  Police also recognized that Raynor continually rubbed his arms against 
the chair throughout the interview.  Id.  The officers then asked Raynor for his 
consent to provide a DNA sample, which he conditionally agreed to.  Id. at 76, 
99 A.3d at 756.  However, Raynor then refused because the police could not 
guarantee that the sample would be destroyed upon completion of the 
investigation.  Id.  Once the interview concluded, an officer swabbed the 
armrests of Raynor’s chair for DNA analysis.  Id. at 77, 99 A.3d at 756.  The 
DNA analysis revealed the DNA swabbed from Raynor’s chair matched the 
DNA collected from the crime scene.  Id.  Police then secured a warrant to 
obtain Raynor’s DNA; this DNA also matched the DNA from the crime scene.  
Id.  
     Raynor filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the DNA evidence obtained 
from the chair and all further evidence obtained therefrom, which the circuit 
court denied.  Id. at 77-79, 99 A.3d at 756-57.  Raynor was convicted by a jury 
in the Circuit Court for Harford County of two counts of rape and related 
crimes.  Id. at 77, 99 A.3d at 756.  Raynor appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals, which affirmed, reasoning the Fourth Amendment did not apply to 
the analysis of Raynor’s DNA.  Id.  Raynor filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which the court granted. Id. at 80, 99 A.3d 
at 758. 
     The Court of Appeals began its analysis by clarifying what was at issue 
before the court.  Raynor, 440 Md. At 81, 99 A.3d at 758.  Raynor, through 
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counsel, conceded at oral argument that the DNA was lawfully obtained.  Id. 
at 81, 99 A.3d at 759. Therefore, the court clarified that the sole issue for 
discussion was the legality of the testing of Raynor’s DNA.  Id. at 82, 99 A.3d 
at 759.  The court then proceeded to outline the framework of the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 82-83, 99 A.3d at 759.  The Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 
82, 99 A.3d at 759.  Fourth Amendment concerns are only implicated through 
government actors.  Id. at 82-83, 99 A.3d at 759 (citing Walker v. State, 432 
Md. 587, 605, 69 A.3d 1066 (2013)). 
     The two-prong Katz test is widely recognized as the sound test in 
determining whether government conduct should be deemed a search under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 82-83, 99 A.3d at 759-60 (citing 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).  
First, a defendant must demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
item or place to be searched.  Id. at 83, 99 A.3d at 760 (citing Walker, 432 Md. 
at 605, 69. A.3d 1066 (2013)).  Second, the defendant must prove that his or 
her expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable.  Id. (citing Walker, 432 
Md. at 605, 69 A.3d 1066).  
     The court then evaluated whether Raynor had demonstrated a subjective 
expectation of privacy when he did not consent to a DNA test at the police 
station.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 83, 99 A.3d at 760.  An individual demonstrates 
a subjective expectation of privacy by showing that he or she “sought ‘to 
preserve something as private.’”  Id. 83-84, 99 A.3d at 760 (citing Williamson 
v. State, 413 Md. 521, 535, 993 A.2d 626 (2010) (quoting McFarlin v. State, 
409 Md. 391, 404, 975 A.2d 862 (2009)).  The court found Raynor 
demonstrated the requisite subjective expectation of privacy through his 
refusal to provide a DNA sample during his interview with the police.  Id. at 
84, 99 A.3d at 760.  
     As to the second prong, the court began with the premise that an 
individual’s identifying physical characteristics are generally outside Fourth 
Amendment protections.  Raynor, 440 Md. At 85, 99 A.3d at 761 (citing 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)).  Here, the court reasoned the 
testing of the junk loci fell outside Fourth Amendment protections because 
such testing merely revealed identifying physical characteristics.  Id. at 85, 99 
A.3d at 761.  A “junk DNA” analysis does not reveal any overreaching or 
complex personal characteristics, as would a genetic trait analysis.  Id. (citing 
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 1955, 1966 (2013)). The thirteen junk loci would 
not allow someone to “discern any socially stigmatizing conditions.”  Id. at 
88, 99 A.3d at 763 (quoting State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 45, 857 A.2d 19, 45 
(2004) (Raker, J., concurring)).  Even if junk DNA analyses could reveal 
personal information, police are only concerned with generating identifying 
numbers for potential matches.  Id. at 87, 99 A.3d at 762 (citing King, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1979)).   
     Next, the court looked to the analogy drawn between fingerprinting and 
junk DNA analysis.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 88, 99 A.3d at 762.  Raynor 
234 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 45.2 
 
 
contended that DNA differs from fingerprints because of DNA’s potential for 
revealing personal information.  Id. at 89, 99 A.3d at 763.  The court rejected 
Raynor’s argument recognizing that both fingerprinting and DNA analysis 
does not reveal any physiological data, which is necessary to implicate the 
Fourth Amendment.  Id. at 90, 99 A.3d at 764.  Here, the targeted analysis 
only revealed information relating to identification, and did not reveal 
physiological data about Raynor as it did in Skinner.  Id. at 89, 99 A.3d at 763; 
see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association, 489 U.S. 602, 609-10, 
616-17 (1989) (holding that toxicological testing of employee’s blood and 
urine to detect alcohol and drugs constituted an unreasonable search)).  Even 
if the police dusted Raynor’s chair for fingerprints, the evidence would have 
been used for the same purpose, to reveal identifying characteristics.  Id.  The 
court also relied on other jurisdictions, which hold that the Fourth Amendment 
is not implicated where DNA testing only reveals identifying characteristics.  
Id. at 89-90, 99 A.3d at 763-64; see United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226 (4th 
Cir. 2012); see also Williamson v. State, 413 Md. 521, 993 A.2d 626 (2010). 
     Finally, the court looked to Kyollo v. United States to address whether the 
DNA analysis constituted a physical intrusion.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 94, 99 
A.3d at 766 (citing Kyollo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).  In Kyollo, 
the Court held that the government’s use of a thermal imager to monitor a 
suspect’s home constitutes an unreasonable physical intrusion.  Raynor, 440 
Md. at 94, 99 A.3d at 766 (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40).   
     Raynor attempted to draw an analogy between Kyllo and the case sub 
judice, arguing that the use of biotechnology is similar to the thermal scanners 
in Kyllo because both reveal characteristics of an individual’s private life “not 
visible to the naked eye.”  Id. at 95, 99 A.3d at 767 (citing Kyllo v. United 
States, 533 U.S. 27).  Raynor argued, and the court acknowledged, that society 
is generally oblivious to the fact that individuals shed genetic material every 
day in public.  Id. at 94, 99 A.3d at 766.  However, the court opined that though 
Raynor unknowingly exposed himself to the public, the government did not 
physically intrude on or into his body in the way described in Kyllo, and 
therefore did not constitute an unreasonable search.  Id. 
     The dissent took great concern with the court’s execution of its Fourth 
Amendment analysis.  Raynor, 440 Md. at 105, 99 A.3d at 773 (Adkins, J., 
dissenting).  Specifically, the dissent addressed the majority’s ignorance of an 
individual’s privacy interests in his or her DNA.  Id.  The dissent also 
recognized that as technology expands, the discovery of personal details in 
DNA material is inevitable and creates an enormous risk of intrusion.  Id. at 
106, 99 A.3d at 773.  Due to this risk, the dissent believed Raynor deserved 
the utmost protection under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Further, the dissent 
argued that the State’s interest in safety and identification of criminal suspects 
does not suffice because the police already knew Raynor’s identity and were 
not arresting him at the time of his interview.  Id.  
     In Raynor, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the DNA testing of 
Petitioner’s thirteen junk loci did not constitute a search under the Fourth 
2015] Raynor v. State 235 
 
 
Amendment.  The court’s decision runs the risk of severely diminishing an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment privacy interests.  As DNA analytical 
techniques evolve, so does their potential to reveal massive amounts of 
personal information.  The State has a significant interest in identifying 
criminal suspects, but the State cannot do so to the detriment of an individual’s 
privacy interests.  Maryland criminal defense attorneys will be faced with an 
uphill battle in their ability to challenge DNA testing due to the court’s 
reluctance to recognize the ambit of information potentially available in DNA. 
